Posts Tagged ‘Miranda’

Ninth Circuit Opinion 05-05-11

Thursday, May 5th, 2011

Doody v. Ryan, No. 06-17161 (5-4-11)(en banc)(Rawlisnson with Schroeder, B. Fletcher, Pregerson, Reinhardt, and Thomas; concurrence by Kozinski; dissent by Tallman with Rymer and Kleinfeld). On remand from the Supremes in light of its Miranda decision in Powell, the 9th, sitting en banc, again holds that the confession to killing nine individuals, of whom six were Buddhist monks, violated petitioner’s Miranda rights and was involuntary. The 9th carefully went through the facts, including the downplaying, deviations, and express misinformation in giving the Miranda warnings to a juvenile, with no criminal priors, and who was foreign. Powell, considering the wording of the Miranda warnings, is not applicable when the police undermine and undercut the warnings in 12 transcript pages of downplaying the simple warnings. As for voluntariness, the 9th also considered the length of the questioning, stretching over 13 hours, by a tag team of officers, who, in a related matter, used the same techniques to squeeze false confessions out of four men later released.

The petitioner was comatose for long periods, and subjected to relentless questioning. Yes, the Arizona state courts had found the warnings valid and the confession voluntary, but the state court was unreasonable in its factual determinations and unreasonable in its application of the law. As the 9th colorfully put it: “[I]f we succumb to the temptation to abdicate our responsibility on habeas review,we might as well get ourselves a big, fat rubber stamp, pucker up, and kiss the Great Writ good-bye.” The majority, in supporting its holding, calls out the dissembling of the dissent’s reading of cases. Concurring, Kozinski discusses AEDPA and its deference, and using that standard, would defer to the state court’s holding that the statement was voluntary, but would find that a Miranda violation did occur and that the state court’s were unreasonable. In dissent,.Tallman joined by Rymer and Kleinfeld, argue that AEDPA deference supports the state court’s rulings. They focus on the reasons why it might be reasonable, and downplay the facts the majority found so convincing.

United States Supreme Court Holds that You Must Speak Up If You Want to Remain Silent!

Tuesday, June 1st, 2010

The Supreme Court held, 5-4 (Kennedy for majority, Sotomayor for the
dissent) that a suspect being interrogated must “unambiguously invoke” the right to remain silent or the right to counsel” for questioning to stop.

Summary:       Silence during the interrogation does not invoke the right to remain silent. A suspect’s Miranda right to counsel must be invoked “unambiguously”, just as the right to counsel, see Davis v. United States, 512 U. S. 452, 459. If the accused makes an “ambiguous or equivocal” statement or no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify the accused’s intent. There is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis.

By choosing to speak to the interrogators, a suspect is “waiving” the right to silence.  Once the government establishes Miranda warnings were given (and understood), an accused “uncoerced” statements establish an “implied” waiver of the right to remain silence.

The majority says, “Had he wanted to re-main silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation. That he made a statement nearly three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver.”

Dissent concludes: Today’s decision turns Miranda upside down. Criminal suspects must now unambiguously invoke their right to remain silent—which, counterintuitively, requires them to speak. At the same time, suspects will be legally presumed to have waived their rights even if they have given no clear expression of their intent to do so. Those results, in my view, find no basis in Miranda or our subsequent cases and are inconsistent with the fair-trial principles on which those precedents are grounded. Today’s broad new rules are all the more unfortunate because they are unnecessary to the disposition of the case before us.

BERGHUIS, WARDEN v. THOMPKINS

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CONSIDERS WHETHER A MIRANDA WARNING EXPIRES

Tuesday, December 22nd, 2009

Maryland v. Michael Blaine Shatzer, Sr.

USSC Case No. 08-680.

Oral Argument Date:  Oct 5 2009

In the groundbreaking case of Miranda v. Arizona, the United States Supreme Court held that police officers must inform suspects of their right to remain silent, to consult with an attorney, to have an attorney present during questioning, and to have an attorney appointed if they cannot afford one. The Miranda opinion also noted that “[i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.”

In the subsequent case of Edwards v. Arizona, the Supreme Court addressed a cognate question: What happens when a police officer reads a suspect a Miranda warning, but still asks questions after the suspect invokes the right to counsel? In Edwards, the Court held that statements made in response to such questioning are inadmissible at trial.

This fall, the Supreme Court will revisit the Miranda-Edwards line of case in Maryland v. Shatzer. Mr. Shatzer, the respondent in this case, was serving a prison sentence on an unrelated crime when a detective first interviewed him. When the detective read Mr. Shatzer his Miranda rights, Mr. Shatzer responded that he wanted an attorney present while the detective asked him questions. The detective wrote in his report, “When I attempted to again initiate the interview, he told me that he would not talk about this case without having an attorney present.” The detective then terminated the interview and closed the case. Two years and seven months later, though, a different detective conducted a follow-up investigation. That detective read Mr. Shatzer his Miranda rights and then — without allowing Mr. Shatzer any access to an attorney — interrogated him. Mr. Shatzer then confessed that he had committed a crime.

At trial, Mr. Shatzer argued that his confession was inadmissible, because the second detective obtained it in violation of Edwards. But in Edwards, only a day had elapsed between the suspect’s invocation of the right to counsel and the second interrogation. In contrast, two years and seven months had elapsed between Mr. Shatzer’s invocation of the right to counsel and the second interrogation. Moreover, while the suspect in Edwards was in continuous police custody between the first and second interrogation, Mr. Shatzer was not. Mr. Shatzer, though, was in prison for that entire period. (more…)